


























The Arab Revolution Is 
Bad News for Iran 
Shahram Akbarzadeh 
The popular revolutions that swept across the Arab world in late 
2010 and 2011 were initially welcomed in Tehran as a vindication 
of its policies. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran had 
maintained a difficult relationship with its Arab neighbours, even 
fighting a bloody eight-year war with one. From the Iranian point 
of view, Arab governments had betrayed Islam by working closely 
with the United States and giving up on the Palestinian cause. At first 
glance, the Arab revolution that deposed the ruling regimes in Tunisia 
and Egypt and the revolt in the Gulf sheikhdoms fitted neatly in the 
narrative of the Iranian regime. The Arab regimes were inclined to 
side with the United States in all international fora and were generally 
criticized for not representing the interest of their own people. But this 
interpretation of the Arab revolution as an automatic endorsement of 
the Iranian worldview was too simplistic to withstand the test of time. 
Very soon after the removal of Hosni Mubarak from office and the 
spread of unrest to Syria and Libya, the Iranian interpretation came 
under severe strain. In Syria, the Bashar al-Assad regime, which had 
been hailed by the Iranian authorities as a genuine popular alternative 
to many other Arab states, seemed to face the same kind of popular 
unrest that had paralysed its neighbours. In Egypt, the Muslim 
brotherhood dismissed suggestions that it might follow the Iranian 
model. Iran's binary worldview of believers versus disbelief could not 
explain the momentous events that engulfed the region. The Arab 
revolution presented a conceptual challenge to the Iranian worldview. 
This has reminded the leadership of the tenuous nature of their hold 
on power. The regime has responded by doubling security measures 
against its internal opposition, dubbed the Green Movement. Only a 
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year after the regime managed to suppress its own opposition rallies, 
the Arab revolution has made it vulnerable once again. 
This chapter begins with a survey of the Iranian position with regard 
to the Arab revolution, and then explores the impact of the Bahrain and 
Syrian conflicts on Iran's standing in the region. It argues that the double 
standard in relation to these conflicts has eroded Iran's soft power on the 
Arab streets and led to its marginalization. The chapter concludes with 
an assessment of the internal implications of this strategic demise as the 
regime feels pressured from within and without. 
Welcoming the Arab Revolution 
The initial Iranian response to the Arab revolution was predictable. 
The revolution was presented as an Islamic awakening, following Iran's 
footsteps. Not only was the Arab revolution seen as a vindication of 
the ruling ideology in lran, it was also presented as evidence of Iran's 
leadership in the region. Iran had constructed an identity of Islamic 
and revolutionary defiance for itself, making itself unique among other 
regional governments for challenging the United States and Israel. It 
was no secret that the Iranian regime saw itself as a regional leader. The 
Arab revolution was an opportunity for the regime to re-state that dailn, 
sometimes in a rather patronizing fashion. 
There was a unanimous view in the Iranian leadership that the Arab 
revolution was the 'aftershock' of the 1979 revolution in Iran. Addressing 
a Friday prayer congregation on 4 February 2011, Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei argued that: 
a powerful cry is being dearly heard today in various regions 
of the Muslim world. Today's event in the north of Africa, in 
Egypt and Tunisia and certain other countries, ... has a special 
meaning ... This is the very same thing that has always been 
regarded as Islamic awakening on the occasion of the triwnph 
of the great Islamic Revolution of the nation of Iran. Today, it is 
manifesting itself [in the Arab world) ... Our revolution became 
an inspiration and role model and this was due to steadfastness, 
resoluteness towards the main ideals, which this revolution 
announced via the imam (Ayatollah Khomeini). The Iranian 
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nation has turned to a role model and you are witnessing the 
signs of this fact today .... Today, the reverberation of your voice 
is being heard in Egypt.1 
107 
In a subsequent speech (22 March 2011), Khamenei stated that the same 
principles and ideas that had been upheld in the Islamic regime of Iran 
were now prompting the Arab people into action. 
The theme of Iran as the role model was echoed by President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other members of the Islamic regime. For 
Ahmadinejad there was no question that the 'Egyptian and Tunisian 
uprisings were inspired by Iran's 'defiance' against western powers'.1 In 
a rather patronizing speech, Ahmadinejad praised the Arab world for 
striving to 'catch up' with Iran. In a clear effort to capitalize on the events, 
the Iranian regime convened a two-day conference in September 2011 
under the rubric of Islamic Awakening. The official Iranian news agency 
boasted that 700 scholars and dignitaries from 80 countries took part in 
this international event. Some of the key participants included leaders 
of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hizbullah and the late 
former president of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani. This conference 
was opened by the Iranian Supreme Leader and included addresses by 
the Iranian President and the Speaker of the Parliament, all of whom 
emphasized the Islamic character of the Arab uprising and Iran's leading 
role in this Islamic Awakening.3 
At the same time, the Iranian leadership also exhibited an awareness 
that its point of view is not shared in the region and warned against 
efforts to derail the revolution. In the words of the Iranian ambassador 
to Algeria, Muhammad Mohammadi, 'as the Islamic Awakening 
spreads around the world, the western efforts aimed at deviating it 
also increase'. 4 Indeed, the Iranian account of the Arab revolution as 
an Islamic Awakening that challenged pro-Western regimes started to 
unravel as the revolt spread to Libya and Syria. In order to contain 
the counter-narrative to its interpretation of the Arab revolution, Iran 
tried to limit news of civil unrest in Libya and Syria. When this proved 
impossible, the Iranian news media downplayed events, and blamed 
Western powers for meddling in the internal affairs of the Muslim world 
and exaggerating the extent of unrest. This was especially highlighted in 
relation to Syria. As Iran's only strategic allies, the unrest in Syria proved 
especially troubling for the Islamic regime. 
In the Iranian interpretation of the Arab revolution, anti-USA 
and anti-Israel states should have been the natural beneficiaries of the 
popular revolts. That is why the spread of anti-government revolts to 
Syria, with its long-standing antagonism towards Israel and difficult 
relationship with the United States, was so dramatically unsettling. Not 
only did it undermine the Islamic regime's narrative of the Arab revolt, 
but it reminded the leadership of a real threat on the home front - that 
is, the potential for the revival of the Green Movement. The Iranian 
leadership had a vested interest in keeping the Bashar al-Assad regime 
in power and did not shy away from providing diplomatic and tangible 
assistance to Damascus. Sakes were raised in mid-2012 when the United 
States commenced a diplomatic campaign to convince Russia and China 
to refrain from vetoing a UN Security Council vote on Syria. This 
prompted the Islamic regime to blast the United States for interfering 
in the internal affairs of an Arab state. The Iranian Fars News Agency 
reported on 2 July 2012 that Iran would not tolerate foreign intervention 
in Syria and warned against military action to topple the Assad regime.5 
It is noteworthy that even some critics within the regime found it 
difficult to reject the narrative of the Islamic awakening. Ayatollah Akbar-
Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who had sided with the reformist 
movement at the 2009 presidential elections and was subsequently 
removed from his post as the Head of the Expediency Council, echoed 
the well-rehearsed line: the Arab revolution was following the Iranian 
footsteps. But he tried to use the occasion to criticize the policies of the 
Ahmadinejad government: 'It is no exaggeration to say that the Islamic 
Iran's revolution has been the role model for the people of the region 
. . . however, in our foreign policy we have acted in such a way that 
revolutionaries of the region are not willing to admit this fact.'6 
Despite Iran's official line, there was discernable disquiet in the 
leadership ranks about the prospects of a contagion effect By the end of 
2010, the Iranian reform movement was showing signs of subsiding, but 
the Arab revolution had the potential to re-energize it. According to Iran 
analyst Farideh Farhi, the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were seen by 
the reformists in Iran as catalysts of activism.1 For the Iranian authorities 
this was a real threat. Fearful of the revival potential for the Green 
Movement, the Islamic regime took preventative measures to contain 
the risk. It refused permission for celebratory rallies in February 2011 
and put Green Movement leaders in prison or under house arrest. On 
14 February 201 l an unlicensed rally was brutally dispersed, resulting 
in one death.8 
The Arab Response 
The claim that the Arab masses were somehow following the footsteps 
of the 1979 Iranian revolution was greeted with bemusement and a 
tinge of derision on the streets of Cairo. This was in line with the 
general assessment of the upheavals in the more informed policy 
circles. In fact many observers commented on the absence of Islam 
as a motivating factor for the Arab revolution. Olivier Roy, a French 
scholar of Islamism, had even suggested that the Arab revolution and 
the popular aspiration for political accountability and responsible 
government signalled the demise of radical Islamism, espoused most 
violently by al-Qaeda.9 Indeed the Arab revolution was widely seen 
by Western observers as a vindication of democratic aspirations as a 
universal force, an interpretation that sat diametrically opposite Iranian 
claims of an Islamic Awakening. 
In Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood has gained significant 
ground in the wake of the revolution, the sense of distancing the 
Egyptian experience from the Iranian model is urgent. The Muslim 
Brotherhood is mindful of the negative publicity it would invite should 
it align itself with Iran. As a result, the Brotherhood leadership has 
repeatedly dismissed suggestions that it is following the Iranian model 
and that its rising fortunes will benefit Iran. In an interview with the 
Voice of America, a spokesperson for the Brotherhood insisted that 
such claims are 'absolutely wrong'. 10 The Brotherhood did not pursue the 
establishment of Islamic theocracy a la Iran, he proclaimed. Instead, 'we 
are calling for a civil state, moderate state, a democratic state, equality, 
prosperity, justice for all and freedom for all citizens. All are equal. Egypt 
is not Iran. Egypt can build its own model of democracy according to 
its culture and Islamic preference'. This position was reinforced by other 
statements by the Brotherhood leadership. In an interview with Spiegel 
(2 July 2011), the Deputy Leader of the Brotherhood stated: 'we are not 
marching with our slogans. We don't want this revolution to be portrayed 
as a revolution of the Muslim Brothers, as an Islamic revolution. This is a 
popular uprising by all Egyptians.' u 
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With the consolidation ofits position as a leading force in the future of 
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood became even more categorical about its 
position vis-a-vis Iran. Following its parliamentary victory in November 
2011, a newly elected Brotherhood member of parliament warned Iran 
that the popular uprising could also reach Iran and unsettle the Islamic 
regime.12 This was the first time the Brotherhood drew a comparison 
between the Islamic regime of Iran and the deposed Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarak. As the conflict in Syria deteriorated and Iranian support 
for the Assad regime continued unabated, the Brotherhood hardened its 
position in solidarity with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Mohammad 
Farouk. Tayfour, secretary-general of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, openly 
referred to Iran as the 'enemy' for arming the Syrian regime. 
As a long-standing political force, now a key player in the future of 
Egypt, the Brotherhood is clearly eager to avoid antagonizing the West 
unnecessarily. But the position vis-a-vis Iran goes beyond political 
expediency. The Arab world is generally suspicious of Iran's intentions 
and regional ambitions. A 2011 survey by the Arab American Institute 
Foundation documented the extent of wariness towards Iran. The survey 
found that 'Iran's favorable ratings have dropped significantly in recent 
years. Iran is seen as not contributing to "peace and stability in the Arab 
world" and there is scant support for Iran's nuclear program: 13 This 
concern with the security risks posed by Iran has been exaggerated by its 
strategic rival, Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi government has been anxious about Iran's anti-
establishment message directed at the Arab kingdoms of the Persian Gulf. 
Iran's claims of support for popular movements were seen in Riyadh as 
a ploy to undermine political stability in the region and allow Iran to 
pursue its territorial claims in the Gulf at best, or engineer regime change 
at worst. This was especially troubling in the case of Bahrain, as will be 
explored below. As far as the Saudi officials were concerned, Iran was 
clearly interfering in Arab affairs. 
Bahrain 
The tiny Kingdom of Bahrain was not immune from the contagion 
of the Arab revolution. In early 2011 Bahrain experienced a wave of 
protest rallies that challenged the authority of Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al 
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Khalifa. The protestors were calling for political reform and responsible 
government but the sectarian divide in Bahrain soon gained prominence 
and transformed the revolt into a battle of Shi'a masses versus Sunni 
rulers. The Shi'a constitute about 70 per cent of the total population in 
Bahrain and have been indigenous to the island, while the ruling Al 
Khalifa family follows the Sunni sect of Islam and conquered Bahrain in 
the late eighteenth century. Due to the sheer size of the Shi'a population, 
the absence of political representation in Bahrain - which was a generic 
problem with monarchic rule - was widely seen by the population as 
deliberately targeting the Shi'a. 
Given its Sunni affiliations and links with other Arab royal families, 
the Al Khalifa family enjoyed the support of Saudi Arabia and other 
sheikhdoms in the region. In contrast, Shi'a Iran has been consistently 
portrayed by the ruling family in Bahrain as a threat to its sovereignty. 
Of course Iran's behaviour provided plenty of evidence to substantiate 
that fear. Iran continued to repeat its territorial claims over Bahrain 
until 1975. The Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic 
regime revived nostalgia for Iran's regional reach. Although Iran did not 
openly challenge Bahrain's sovereignty, newspaper editorials and public 
statements by members of parliament about Bahrain's position as an 
integral part of Iran reverberated throughout the region and caused 
serious concern about an impending policy reversal in Tehran. 
Due to the above sectarian and goo-strategic factors, the 2011 uprising 
in Bahrain rapidly evolved into an arena for regional rivalry. After weeks 
of street protest, the ruling Al Khalifa requested the assistance of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in suppressing the popular uprising. 
Saudi security forces entered Bahrain via the King Fahd causeway on 13 
March 2011 and promptly put down the revolt The Iranian response to 
this move was predictable and only confirmed suspicions that Tehran 
was sponsoring the revolt. Iran recalled its ambassador from Bahrain 
in an official protest. A"few months later (October 2011), the Iranian 
Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs told Fars News 
Agency that Iran had no plans to return the ambassador to Bahrain. 14 
Bahrain reciprocated and recalled its ambassador from Iran in March 
2011, but reinstated the ambassador in August 2012 to resume full 
diplomatic relations. The Iranian authorities, however, still insisted on 
keeping their diplomatic relations with Bahrain in suspense. According 
to the state-run news agency, Press TV, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister 
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Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said, 'the return of Bahrain's ambassador 
to Tehran is the decision of the Bahraini establishment but Iran will 
make no decision to reinstate its ambassador to Manama as long as [the 
Bahraini regime's] repression of the Bahraini Muslim people continues: is 
The Bahrain case was seen in Iran as a vindication of its worldview 
and ideological stand. The intervention of US-friendly GCC troops to 
suppress the revolt was fodder to the Tehran propaganda machine. 
The foreign intervention of Saudi, Qatari and UAE forces in 
Bahrain brought relations between Iran and its Arab neighbours to a 
new low. While Iran protested that the GCC move was a violation of 
the popular will in Bahrain, Arab kingdoms accused Iran of meddling 
in their internal affairs by sowing sectarian discord. The slump in Iran's 
relationship with Bahrain coincided with a legal spy charge in Kuwait 
which implicated Iran as the mastermind of an extensive spying network 
in that kingdom.16 With no signs of improvement in relations between 
Iran and its neighbours, Shaykh Al Khalifa accused Iran of continuing 
to pursue territorial claims on Bahrain and urged a united Arab front to 
meet what he termed a 'grave threat: 17 This call came shortly after another 
major diplomatic setback. 
On 11 October 2011, reports of a major security sting were reported 
in the US media. Two men with links to the Iranian government were 
arrested and charged with plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador 
to the United States.18 This was a diplomatic disaster for Iran. One of 
the accused was known to have links to the Quds security forces, which 
reports directly to the Supreme Leader. This implicated the highest office 
in Iran. The general tone of reports and commentary on this episode 
in the United States was a mix of disbelief at the clumsy nature of the 
plot and reaffirmation of the assessment of Iran as a destabilizing force. 
Robert Dreyfuss, writing for the Tehran Bureau, captured some of that 
mood when he called it a 'bizarre case: asking what could Iran hope 
to gain from this assassination; nothing but trouble. 1~ More seasoned 
analysts were less reticent in their assessment. Martyn Indyk, a former 
US ambassador to Israel and now Director for Foreign Policy at the 
Brookings Institute, argued that this event was consistent with Iran's 
behaviour in the past regarding assassination and terrorist attacks on 
foreign soil, citing the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers. For Indyk, this 
episode was a significant sign of Iran's frustration at the way the Arab 
revolution has marginalized Tehran.w 
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Syria 
The spread of the popular revolution to Syria presented the Islamic 
regime in Iran with a serious challenge, both in terms of ideology and 
geo-strategy. The Syrian revolt shattered the myth that the Arab Spring 
was an Islamic revolution against the West and its allies. Syria had all 
the credentials of an anti-Western state. It had fought a war with Israel 
(regarded widely in the Middle East as a US proxy) and maintained 
a territorial dispute with that country over the Golan Heights. It was 
blacklisted by the United States for its role in Lebanon and was put under 
economic sanctions. Syrian support for Hizbullah, which implicated 
the Bashar al-Assad regime in the assassination of former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (February 2005), was the catalyst for an 
international consensus to expel Syrian troops from southern Lebanon 
by April that year. ii This consensus included Arab states, most notably 
Saudi Arabia, and was seen as evidence of a Western-run conspiracy to 
undermine Syria. According to this narrative, Syria was as anti-USA as 
Iran, and should not have been affected by popular uprisings. 
The cracks in the official accounts of the Arab revolution were made 
even more daunting for the Iranian regime as Assad's hold on power 
was tested by the spread of the revolt. Syria represented the only state 
ally for Iran in the region. Its geographical location allowed the Iranian 
regime direct access to southern Lebanon, a most valued logistical asset 
for the training and supply of the Hizbullah. The decline of Assad's 
authority in Syria and the descent into civil war had a major impact on 
Iran's access to Hizbullah. This was unacceptable to the Islamic regime 
in Iran. The Iranian position was categorical: the Assad regime must 
not fall. 
The initial reaction in Iran to the unfolding events in Syria (March 
2011) was one of denial Iran's media coverage of Syria was conspicuous 
by its absence. But it was clear that the Iranian authorities could not 
simply wish away the unrest in Syria. Amid growing urgency of hourly 
coverage of the Syrian conflict by leading news agencies such as the BBC 
and Al-Jazeera, the Iranian media commenced an unashamedly partisan 
coverage that contradicted other international reports. According to 
the Iranian media, the Syrian conflict was a result of terrorist activity, 
funded and sponsored by Western powers. The confiict was portrayed 
as a Western conspiracy to topple a representative government. 1his 
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was of course the official line and was repeated continuously by state 
officials. 22 
For the Islamic regime in Iran, the continuing crisis in Syria and the 
prospects of Assad's fall were a major ideological and strategic threat. The 
decision to provide support to the em battled regime in Syria was therefore 
not surprising. A draft report to the UN Security Council noted Iranian 
military supplies were sent to Damascus to help crush the uprising, in 
violation of the UN ban on the export of armsY The report also noted 
that arms were supplied to the rebels by Arab Kingdoms of the Gulf. This 
level of external interest in the Syrian case risked turning the conflict 
into a proxy war and made Iran even more determined to maintain the 
Assad regime as a bulwark against the rising Saudi influence. This, argues 
Mohammed Ayoob, gives the Syrian conflict a major regional edge.24 As 
the stakes were raised and the international community became more 
concerned about curtailing the Iranian arms supply, the Islamic regime 
turned to its neighbour and utilized Iraqi airspace to continue its supply 
of arms to Syria.2' 
Iran's affiliation with the ruling Syrian regime pushed another 
important factor to the fore. The Assad family belongs to the minority 
Alawite community (following Ali bin Abi Talib, the first imam of the 
Shi'a sect) that is regarded as heresy by many in the Sunni community, 
which constitutes a majority in Syria and most of the Arab world (but 
not Iraq).26 The wealthy ruling regimes in Saudi Arabia and its Gulf 
kingdoms, as well as other Arab regimes such as that of the outspoken 
King of Jordan, have all viewed the Syrian Alawite regime with disdain. 
In a major speech in December 2004, for example, King Abdullah warned 
of an emerging Shi'a Crescent, pointing to the political ascendancy of 
Shi'a-affiliated political players from Lebanon, to Syria, to Iraq and Iran. 
In the past, Iran had denied the sectarian factor in its foreign policy. 
In fact it had made extra efforts to downplay sectarian affiliations and 
emphasize the unity of the Muslim umma. According to Suzanne Maloney, 
a leading scholar on Iran, this country's foreign policy experienced 
ebbs and flows commensurate with the change of guards, but narrow 
sectarianism was never a focus.27 Instead, Iran promoted a revolutionary 
agenda of a united Muslim resistance front against unresponsive national 
governments and their Western backers. 
Such efforts were most effective in relation to the Palestinian Hamas. 
Iran emerged as a major sponsor of Hamas following its take-over of 
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the Gaza Strip in 2007 - supplying its arsenal of rockets that threatened 
Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. But the Arab revolution changed the landscape 
dramatically. For Arab observers, Iranian foreign policy seemed to be 
guided by its sectarian identity. First in relation to Bahrain and then in 
relation to Syria, Iran sided with Shi'a players: one in opposition, one 
in power. This impression was a major blow to Iran's self-image as the 
champion of the Muslim masses against the corruption of the Western-
propped ruling regimes. 
Iran's unapologetic support for the Syrian regime proved to be a major 
strategic liability, and cost Iran dearly. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Palestinian Hamas were incensed by the Assad regime's brutality 
against the opposition, which included the Syrian branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The extent of the rift was highlighted by the Egyptian 
President Mohammed Morsi, who was prepared to offend his Iranian 
hosts at the convention of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran {June 
2012) by openly declaring support for the Syrian masses against the Assad 
regime.28 This rift also marginalized Iran on the Palestinian front. The 
Hamas opposition to the Assad regime called into question its alignment 
with Iran and led to a break in the Hamas-Syria-Iran alliance that had 
helped it manage the Gaza Strip.'9 Instead Hamas turned to Egypt (now 
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood), Qatar and Turkey for financial 
and diplomatic assistance and recognition. 
Iran's Demise 
Contrary to Iran's expectations, the Arab revolution did not strengthen the 
position of the Islamic regime as the leading force in the Middle East. The 
revolution spread throughout the region, challenging unrepresentative 
governments, regardless of their ideology. 1his was contrary to Iran's 
worldview that saw the popular uprising as an Islamic revolution against 
US-friendly states. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and 
more widely the growing assertiveness of Islamists in the Arab world, 
did not equate with greater influence for Iran. Instead Turkey, with its 
own experience of adapting Islam into public life, has proved to be a 
much more appealing model. This model offers a fresh approach to Islam 
and politics, an approach that has been marginalized in the Middle East 
by zealous Islamists who pursued a top-down Islamization of society by 
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capturing the state or opportunistic rulers who used Islam to legitimize 
their autocratic rule. The Turkish model, which may be dubbed Muslim-
democratic, mirroring the Christian-democratic tradition in Europe, 
proved to be most popular for the Muslim Brotherhood as it attempted 
to navigate its way in the uncharted post-Mubarak era. The obvious 
advantages of this model are manifold: 
I. It makes a dear and unequivocal reference to Islam. No popular 
regime in the Middle East can ignore the deep connection with 
religion and its significance in the collective sense of identity and 
purpose. 
2. It is equally committed to democracy as the best model of 
government. The Brotherhood has a long history of working 
within the system and, despite pressure from extremist splinter 
groups that challenged the legitimacy of democracy as 'man-
made' (as opposed to divine Islamic law), has remained 
committed to operate within the boundaries of democratic 
rule. Critics may argue that this behaviour has more to do with 
pragmatism than a principled commitment - but that does not 
detract from the modus operandi of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
3. It is consistent with Western expectations on the future 
direction of political developments in the Middle East. This is an 
important consideration. The Muslim Brotherhood is fully aware 
of the negative image associated with the Iranian model and 
how that could alienate significant support (or tolerance) for its 
growing role in the post-Mubarak era. 
The growing popularity of the Muslim-democratic model in the wake 
of the Arab revolution attests to the limits of the Iranian model and 
its fading influence in the region. But what has seriously undermined 
Iran's retracting soft power is the widely held view in the region that it 
is pursuing a sectarian foreign policy. Iran's double standard in relation 
to the popular uprisings in Bahrain and Syria has seriously damaged 
its standing. Support for the minority regime of the Alawite Bashar 
al-Assad against the popular uprising of the Sunni masses in Syria 
sits in stark contrast with Iran's vehement condemnation of the Sunni 
Al Khalifa regime and support for the Shi'a masses. Iran had tried to 
avoid sectarian affiliations in its foreign policy in the past, but the Arab 
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revolution has forced its hand and any capital it may have accrued on 
the Arab streets by sponsoring the Sunni Hamas movement against 
Israel has rapidly evaporated. 
The rise of the Muslim-democratic model, espoused in Turkey 
and increasingly popular in Egypt, also undermines Iran's claim to 
be the voice of Arab/Muslim masses in relation to Israel. Turkey has 
managed to gain significant traction in the Middle East for its firm, 
but not hostile, relations with Israel. Turkey's serious diplomatic 
dash with Israel over the latter's illegal treatment of the Gaza flotilla 
enhanced Ankara's public standing on the Arab streets. This episode, 
and Turkey's consistently assertive relations with Israel under the 
leadership of the Justice and Development Party, contradict the 
Iranian worldview that good relations with the United States would 
automatically translate into submitting to Israeli whims in the region. 
The dynamics of Turkey's relations with Israel is already being 
reproduced in Egypt as the Muslim Brotherhood consolidates its 
position. Egypt under the presidency of Mohammed Morsi is more 
than likely to take a less accommodating position in relation to Israel 
and follow a trajectory resembling that of Turkey. This will signify a 
break with the Mubarak era and undermine Iran's claim of being the 
sole champion of Muslim interests. 
Conclusion 
The rapid demise of Iran's soft power in the Arab world has coincided 
with the growing salience of the sectarian divide. 1his is a threat to the 
political stability of the region. The growing prominence of the sectarian 
fault-line in the Arab world has the potential to fracture the popular push 
for democratic rule and undermine the legitimacy of the revolution. This 
is most evident in Bahrain where the uprising has become widely seen 
in the Arab world to be manipulated by Iran. The Bahrain movement for 
reform has suffered as a result of this association. 
Iran finds itself in a lonely spot. The Arab revolution has highlighted 
the limits of its ideological appeal. This has internal implications for the 
ruling regime. The loss of its natural support-base on the Arab streets 
has increased tension within the regime, even though the Islamic regime 
has been at pains to conceal internal discord. In 2011, a dispute between 
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the supreme leader and the President over a ministerial appointment 
paralysed the government for nearly two weeks, with President 
Ahmadinejad boycotting all official meetings. 30 Tensions between the 
President and the supreme leader continued to fester and, in February 
2012, the President was summoned to appear before the parliament 
and respond to a grilling set of questions about his policies. The very 
public nature of this high-level discord is unprecedented, something 
not seen since the Islamists managed to eliminate the liberal faction 
associated with the presidency of Abulhassan Banisadr in 1980-1. 
The Arab revolution and growing internal discord also raise the 
prospects of the resumption of protests in Iran. It may be noted that the 
2009 Green Movement in Iran was the precursor of the 2010-ll Arab 
revolution. The latter in turn could rejuvenate the Green Movement. 
The prospects of the Arab revolt engulfing Iran have indeed been noted 
by many observers, including the Muslim Brotherhood. This is a great 
concern for the Iranian leadership as it tries to maintain its grip on 
power. The Islamic regime is fully aware of the risks and has moved 
to contain the threat from within. It observed how the Arab uprising 
caught incumbent regimes by surprise, especially in Tunisia and Egypt. 
The Islamic regime is trying to avoid the same fate by keeping its guard 
up and repressing its internal opponents. 
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